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The Effects of a Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Tax: 
Consumption, Calorie Intake, Obesity, and Tax Burden by Income 
 
Abstract 
Taxing sugar-sweetened beverages has been proposed as a means to reduce calorie intake, 
improve diet and health, and generate revenue that governments can use to address the obesity-
caused health and economic burden.  Two beverage demand systems were estimated using retail 
purchase data for high-income and low-income households.  Using the estimated demand 
elasticities we examined the impacts of a hypothetical 20-percent effective tax rate (or about 0.5 
cent per ounce) on beverage consumption, calorie intake, body weight, and tax revenue and 
burden.  Our results suggest that such a tax would induce an average reduction of 34 and 40 
calories per day among adults and children, respectively.  These calorie reductions could 
translate to 3.6 and 4.2 pounds of weight reductions for adults and children and hence reduce the 
obesity rate from 33.5 percent to 30.8 percent for adults and from 16.1 percent to 13.4 percent 
for children.  Tax revenue is estimated to total $5.8 billion in 2007. The tax burden represents 
about one percent of per-capita food and beverage spending and is regressive. 
  
Keywords: beverage demand, sugar-sweetened beverage tax, soda tax, obesity, tax revenue  
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Introduction 
Over the past three decades, U.S. obesity rates have more than double among adults and 
tripled among children (Flegal et al., 2010; Ogden et al., 2010).  Although the obesity prevalence 
has plateaued in recent years, it remains a major health and economic concern in the United 
States.  Concurrently, children and adults have substantially increased their consumption of 
sugar-sweetened beverages (SSB) (figure 1). As researchers examine intervention strategies to 
tackle American weight gain, the association between obesity and SSB consumption has 
received increasing attention. 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
Responding to high childhood obesity rates, the Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2009) 
recently advocated local Governments tax calorie-dense, nutrient-poor foods and beverages.  
Similar recommendations have been proposed as a means of reducing SSB consumption, 
improving diet and health, and generating revenue for obesity-prevention programs (Brownell 
and Frieden, 2009; Jacobson and Brownell, 2000; Powell and Chaloupka, 2009).   
In this study, we estimate the effect of taxing SSBs on beverage consumption, calorie 
intake, body weight, and tax revenue.  Our approach involves the estimation of beverage demand 
using national household purchase data.  We apply the demand elasticities and a hypothetical tax 
rate to nationally representative surveys of individual consumption to estimate adjustments in 
calorie intake from beverages and resulting body-weight changes.  Nationally representative data 
allow us to calculate the tax-induced reduction in obesity. Two beverage demand systems are 
stratified by income to improve elasticity estimates, compare tax effects by income, and 
determine the regressivity.   
Review of Literature   4
Two recent systematic literature reviews find a positive link between SSB consumption 
and obesity (Malik et al., 2006; Vartanian et al., 2007).  Vartanian et al. (2007) found that studies 
with stronger methods (longitudinal and experimental vs. cross-sectional) reported larger effects 
of increased SSB consumption on increased energy intake and weight gain.  Duffey et al. (2010) 
examined the consumption of four foods (soda, whole milk, pizza, and hamburger) using 20-year 
longitudinal data and found a soda tax, without considering other beverages except whole milk, 
would  significantly decrease energy intake.   
Some studies point to evidence of large price responses in school cafeteria experiments 
that cut the price of healthy snacks and raise the price of unhealthy snacks (French et al., 2001; 
Jeffrey et al., 1994).  Results from in-school experiments may not be comparable in retail food 
markets because children have unique utility functions partly due to limited resources and the 
variety of snacks in schools is restricted.  
Cross-sectional studies investigating State-level soda taxes and body weight have found 
minimal to no association (Fletcher et al., 2009 and 2010; Powell et al., 2009; Sturm et al., 
2010).  A plausible explanation is that sales taxes are generally small and not displayed on the 
supermarket shelf, and therefore, consumers may be unaware and less responsive when making 
retail purchases (McLaughlin, 2009). Furthermore, obesity is affected by numerous factors in 
addition to beverage prices.  
A recent review of food demand research revealed an own-price elasticity for sodas and 
other beverages of -0.8 to -1.0 (Andreyeva et al., 2010).   The reported demand elasticities have 
been used to extrapolate potential effects of a SSB tax (Andreyeva et al., 2010; Brownell et al., 
2009; Chaloupka et al., 2009).  Schoreter et al. (2009) utilized elasticities for regular and diet   5
sodas reported by Dhar et al. (2003) and found that a 10-percent tax on regular soda would 
reduce body weight by 0.2 pounds; no other alternative beverages, however, were considered.  
There are deficiencies in the reported elasticities for our evaluation. When a particular 
beverage is taxed, consumers will respond by reallocating their beverage purchases among 
alternative beverage choices. Lacking cross-price estimates has led researchers to rely solely on 
the own-price elasticity (Brownell et al., 2009; Chaloupka et al., 2009).  This is a major 
limitation for evaluating the impact of a SSB tax on obesity because some juices and milk have 
more calories than regular sodas (USDA-ARS, 2010).   
Secondly, in order to fully examine beverage-energy intake, SSBs and their low-calorie 
counterparts need to be distinguished.  There are studies that differentiate regular and diet sodas 
(Dhar et al., 2003; Pittman, 2004; Bergtold et al., 2004), but to our knowledge, there has been no 
attempt to separate sugar-sweetened sports, energy, or fruit drinks from their low-calorie 
counterparts.  We specify a demand system to address the above limitations. 
Data and Methods 
Two nationwide datasets are used to evaluate dietary and economic impacts of levying a 
tax on SSBs.  Data from 1998-2007 Nielsen Homescan panels (Nielsen, 2007) are used to 
estimate two beverage demand systems stratified by income.  The demand price elasticities and a 
hypothetical tax are applied to individual food intake data from the 2003-06 National Health and 
Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES, CDC-NCHS, 2009) to estimate changes in beverage 
consumption, calorie intake, and body weight for each NHANES respondent.   
Nielsen Homescan Panel 
Nielsen maintains a Homescan panel utilizing a sample design and sample weight for 
national projection based on nine demographic characteristics, including age, income, household   6
size, education, occupation, race, and ethnicity (Muth et al., 2007).  Nielsen also recruits a 
reserve pool of households who participate when a panelist of similar demographic 
characteristics drops out.  Homescan data available to us ranged in sample size from roughly 
7,500 to 63,000 (depending on the year) averaging 22,750 household during 1998-2007. Sample 
weights allow us to project to national figures for each year. 
In the case of beverages, each household scans the Uniform Product Code (UPC) for all 
purchases made at grocery stores or other retail outlets, generally on a weekly basis.  In addition 
to demographics, the data also include quantities, expenditures, and product characteristics. 
Beverages are grouped into eight categories—sugar-sweetened beverages, diet (low-calorie) 
beverages, three types of milk, 100 percent juices, coffee/tea, and bottled water (see table 1 for 
definitions).  
[Insert table 1 here]   
  Beverages in powdered or concentrate form are converted into ready-to-drink quantities.  
We aggregate purchase quantities and expenditures (net of coupon and promotional discounts) 
into 120 monthly observations for each income group. Monthly price is imputed as a unit value 
by taking the ratio of expenditure to quantity.  The midpoint of the reported income range and 
the household size are used to express household income as a percent of the Federal poverty 
threshold.  To classify households into high and low income, we use the 185-percent poverty 
threshold, which is the income eligibility cutoff for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program 
for Women, Infants, and Children (USDA-FNS, 2010). 
  Sample means and standard errors of the variables in the demand system are reported in 
table 2.  Low-income households allocated a larger proportion of their beverage budget to SSB 
and whole milk, while high-income households allocated a higher share to diet drinks. Consistent   7
with the literature, low-income households pay lower prices than high-income households for all 
beverages due to quality differences, brand-level purchases, economies of scale, and 
neighborhood effects (see Ver Ploeg et al., 2009).  
[Insert table 2 about here] 
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) 
NHANES respondents undertake a comprehensive medical examination, as well as report 
24-hour dietary intakes, income, and demographic information.  Nutrient information embedded 
in NHANES allows us to aggregate beverage consumption into eight categories, as in the 
Homescan data.  Using the 2003-06 NHANES data and after excluding children younger than 2, 
pregnant and/or lactating women, and those with missing beverage intake or income data, our 
sample consists of 15,613 respondents (7,291 children aged 2 to 19 and 8,322 adults 20 and 
older).  Infants and pregnant/lactating women are excluded because of lacking body weight 
thresholds for weight classification. 
During 2003-06, daily per capita consumption of the eight beverages varied by age and 
income (table 3).  On average, low-income adults consumed more SSBs per day than high 
income adults by 61 calories, or about half of a 12 ounce can of cola. SSBs accounted for 58 
percent of beverage calories consumed by low-income adults, compared to 51 percent by high-
income adults.  Conversely, low-income children consumed fewer calories from SSBs (46 
percent of beverages calories) than high-income children (49 percent).  Low-income individuals 
(both adults and children) consumed more juices and whole milk, but less skim milk, coffee/tea, 
and bottled water than high-income individuals.  
[Insert table 3 about here] 
Almost Ideal Demand System    8
This study focuses on beverage consumption, and therefore, beverages are assumed to be 
weakly separable from all other goods. The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS, Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980) is used for our empirical estimation of a beverage demand system, as shown 
in equation (1) 
(1)  wi = αi* + ∑i γij lnpj + βi ln(m/P*) + ei  i = 1, … , n, 
where wi is the beverage expenditure share for beverage i; pj is the price for beverage j; m is the 
total expenditure for all beverages; and ei is the disturbance term.  P* is a price index defined by  
lnP* = α0* + ∑ αi* lnpi + 1/2 ∑i∑j γij* lnpi lnpj  
We hypothesized that monthly beverage consumption is influenced by temperature and it 
exhibits a time trend over the sample period.  The method developed by Alston et al (2001) was 
used to incorporate temperature and time trend variables are incorporated into the constant terms 
in the AIDS model: 
αi* = αi + φ1i (temperature) + φ2i (time trend) and 
α0* = α0 + υ1i (temperature) + υ2i (time trend). 
Parameters to be estimated are αi, φ1i, φ2i, υ1i, υ2i,, γij, and βi.   Conditional expenditure (εi) 
and uncompensated price (εij) elasticity estimates at sample means can be calculated as: 
(2)  εi = 1 + βi/wi and 
(3)  εij = (γij - βi (wj - βjln (m/ P*))/wi – δij; 
where δij is the Kronnecker delta that is unity if i = j and zero otherwise. 
The iterative seemingly-unrelated-regression technique was used to estimate the AIDS 
model with homogeneity and symmetry conditions imposed. The data for the AIDS model (1) 
add up by construction.  The estimates were corrected for the first-order autocorrelation (Berndt   9
and Savin, 1975).  For brevity, the parameter estimates are not reported (but available upon 
request) and the demand elasticities are reported in tables 4 and 5.   
Results of Beverage Demands 
All own-price elasticities for both low- and high-income populations are found to be 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% probability level, with the exception of skim milk 
for low-income (tables 4 and 5).  Among the low-income population, the demands for diet 
drinks, skim milk, whole milk, and bottled water are found to be own-price inelastic, whereas the 
demands for SSBs, low-fat milk, juices, and coffee/tea are own-price unitary at the 95% 
confidence level.  Of the 56 cross-price elasticities for low income, 17 of them are statistically 
different from zero at least at the 5% probability level, and 6 (11) of them are positive (negative) 
indicating substitution (complement) relationships. Little research has been done on low-income 
beverage demand with the exception of Yen et al. (2004), in which case, our elasticities are 
comparable.   
[Insert tables 4 & 5 about here] 
Among high-income households, SSB is the only category that is own-price elastic (-1.29 
at the mean), indicating a 10 percent increase in price will decrease purchases by 12.9 percent.  
Among the remaining seven beverages, high-income households are found to be less price 
responsive for diet drinks, low-fat milk, and coffee/tea (with mean elasticities ranging from -0.33 
to -0.46) than for skim milk, whole milk, juices, and bottled water. Of the 56 cross-price 
elasticities for high income, 23 were statistically different from zero at the 5% probability level. 
The magnitude of own-price responsiveness among beverage categories varies across 
income populations. For example, the low-income demand for diet drinks is more price elastic 
than the high-income demand (-0.70 vs. -0.46), but the finding is reversed for SSBs (-0.95 vs. -  10
1.29).  Likewise, the demands for skim milk, whole milk, and bottled water are found to be more 
price elastic for high-income households than those for low-income households.   
Effects of Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages  
Several key assumptions are made in order to evaluate the effects of a SSB tax using the 
estimated demand elasticities. First, there are potential differences within the at-home and away-
from-home markets.  Due to data limitations, estimating the away-from-home demand for 
beverages is challenging.  Consumers often pay a single price for a meal, such as a combo meal 
at a fast food restaurant, which often includes a beverage.  Additionally, some restaurants offer 
free refills. Thus, quantity is ill-measured for the price.  Consequently, we assume the same 
demand elasticities for at-home and away-from-home consumption.  This assumption has been 
made implicitly in the past studies estimating changes in beverage consumption from taxation 
(Andreyeva et al., 2010; Brownell et al., 2009; Chaloupka et al., 2009; Schroeter et al., 2008). 
Further, using household purchase data allows us to examine the impacts of a SSB tax by 
income. 
Secondly, a tax can be levied as an ad valorem excise tax based on price (e.g., sales tax) 
or as a specific excise tax based on volume.  A sales tax is usually paid by consumers making 
retail purchases, whereas a specific excise tax is usually paid by those who are further up in the 
distribution chain (i.e., manufacturers or distributors).  A sales tax is generally not displayed on 
the shelf in grocery stores, and thus consumers may not be aware of the tax burden.  Moreover, 
beverage prices vary by brand, container size, and other factors creating an incentive for 
consumers to substitute lower priced beverages for the higher price ones, resulting in limited 
response to a sales tax (Brownell et al).  Finally, individuals receiving food stamp benefits from   11
the Federal Government are exempt from paying sales taxes on beverages and are therefore, not 
affected by such a policy.   
When a specific excise tax is levied, it will be shared by producers and consumers 
depending on the demand and supply conditions.  In this study, we assumed that an excise tax is 
levied such that consumers face a 20-percent price increase on all SSBs.  A 20-percent tax rate is 
chosen for illustration purposes and due to its closeness to proposals in various States, such as 
New York.     
   A final assumption addresses the inevitable waste between the amount purchased and 
consumed.  Our demand estimates are based on purchase data and impacts are measured using 
intake data.  We assumed a constant proportional waste measure—percentage change in 
purchases is equivalent to the change in consumption. 
Tax-induced changes in calorie intake 
Applying the estimated demand elasticities and a 20-percent effective tax to individual 
consumption data from NHANES, we estimate changes in beverage consumption and associated 
calorie intake (table 6).  There are mixed complements and substitutes among the eight beverage 
categories. Our results suggest a net decrease in calorie intake from all beverages of 36.8 calories 
a day for low-income adults, 33.3 for high-income adults, 34.2 for all adults, 33.1 for low-
income children, 44.7 for high-income children, and 40 for all children. 
Net changes in calorie intake from non-SSBs are small relative to those of SSBs. The 
small changes in non-SSB consumption essentially cancel each other out. This finding does not 
imply ignoring cross-price effects will not bias the estimated impacts.  Exclusion of all relevant 
beverages would result in an incomplete beverage demand system and hence bias the demand 
elasticity estimates.    12
Potential reductions in body weight and obesity prevalence 
The dynamic relationship between calorie intake and body weight is quite complex—
given a fixed reduction in daily energy intake, an individual’s weight will decrease sharply but 
then saturate to a new steady state, which can take several years to achieve (Chow and Hall, 
2008). One frequently used relationship in textbooks (e.g., Whitney et al., 2002) and scientific 
articles (e.g., Duffey et al., 2010) is that a pound of fat tissue has about 3,500 calories, which we 
use to predict the tax-induced weight loss and the resulting changes in the overweight and 
obesity prevalence.  
The NHANES collects information on food and nutrient intake, as well as measured body 
weight and height for each respondent, making the data applicable for translating a reduction in 
calorie intake into body weight changes.  By calculating body weight reductions for each 
respondent, we use the sample weights to estimate the after-tax prevalence of overweight and 
obesity.  
Among adults, the tax was predicted to result in a weight loss of 3.8, 3.5, and 3.6 pounds, 
respectively, for low-income, high-income, and all adults, respectively.  These weight losses 
decrease the proportion of overweight adults from 66.9 percent to 62.8 percent and from 33.5 
percent to 30.8 percent for the obesity prevalence.  According to 2003-06 NHANES data, almost 
5 percent of adults in the U.S. were overweight by no more than 3 pounds.  Therefore, a small 
reduction in body weight can have a measurable effect on the obesity prevalence.  Further, some 
overweight and obese adults consumed large quantities of SSBs, and are expected to experience 
sufficient weight loss to improve their body weight status.   
  The tax-induced weight losses are predicted to be 3.5, 4.7, and 4.2 pounds for low-
income, high-income, and all children, respectively.  The prevalence of overweight children (at   13
the 85
th percentile or higher) is predicted to decline from 32 percent to 26.7 percent and the 
obesity prevalence (95
th percentile or higher) would decline from 16.1 percent to 13.4 percent.  
Overall, the reduction in overweight and obesity prevalence is predicted to be similar between 
high- and low-income adults but larger for high-income children than for their low-income 
counterparts.   
Tax revenue and burden 
Under the assumed 20-percent effective tax rate, we calculate tax revenues by 
multiplying the tax (in dollars) by the after-tax consumption.  We use the average SSB price 
reported by Homescan panelists in 2007 (2.37 cents per ounce for high income and 2.19 for low 
income) to calculate the tax revenue for each income group.  We predict, on average, per capita 
tax revenues from SSB consumption to total $19.19 in a year. In 2007, there were approximately 
301.6 million people in the U.S. (US Census Bureau, 2010).  Therefore, we estimate tax 
revenues of $5.8 billion over a year.  This estimate is comparable, after adjusting for tax rate, to 
the $14.9 billion from a 1-cent-per-ounce tax predicted for the 2010 population by the Rudd 
Center for Food Policy and Obesity.   
Our estimates indicate that low-income individuals would pay slightly more SSB tax than 
high-income individuals ($19.97 versus $18.84).  According to the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007), per capita spending on foods and beverages in 
2007 was $1,920 and $3,125 for low- and high-income populations.  By expressing the SSB tax 
as a percent of total food and beverage spending, we conclude that a tax on SSB is more 
burdensome to the low-income population, although it represents about 1 percent of their total 
food and beverage spending. 
Conclusions   14
The use of economic incentives or disincentives to encourage healthful food choices, and 
hence reduce the incidence of obesity, has received heightened support and attracted research 
efforts.  The rich food demand literature suggests many foods are generally own-price inelastic 
(Andreyeva et al., 2010).  Under inelastic demand, price manipulations alone will not induce 
large consumer responses.  Researchers have examined the effects of taxing salty snacks and fat 
in dairy products, as well as the effects of subsidizing the consumption of fruits, vegetables, and 
milk (Kuchler et al., 2004; Chouinard et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2010).  These three empirical 
studies support the economic theory that “[the] first fundamental theorem of taxation: a tax has 
little effect on inelastic goods” (McCloskey, 1982, p. 309).   
A void exists in the beverage demand literature for elasticities needed to address the 
budget allocation among competing beverages distinguished by calorie contents.  In this study, 
we estimated two beverage demand systems to obtain the demand elasticities for eight beverages 
among low- and high-income populations.  The demand elasticities were applied to individual 
intake data from NHANES to estimate the tax-induced reduction in calories.  
On average, reductions in daily intake of 34.2 and 40 calories were predicted for adults 
and children, respectively. Applying the frequently used relationship of 3500 calories for one 
pound of body weight, we estimated a weight loss of 3.6 and 4.2 pounds for adults and children, 
respectively.  Because a large number of adults and children are a few pounds over the 
overweight and obesity thresholds, and many overweight and obese individuals consume large 
quantities of SSBs, the corresponding reductions in obesity prevalence are noticeable—from 
33.5 to 30.8 percent for adults and 16.1 to 13.4 percent for children.  NHANES data also indicate 
many individuals are just a few pounds below the BMI cutoffs for overweight and obesity.  
Reduced consumption of SSBs triggered by the tax could prevent them from joining the ranks of   15
the obese or overweight.  However, it will take substantial reductions in energy intake, and/or 
increases in energy expenditure, to reverse three decades of U.S. weight gain.  In order to reach 
similar mean weights of the 1970’s, Swinburn et al. (2009) found that a reversal of increased 
energy intake on the order of 500 calories per day for adults and 350 calories per day for children 
would be necessary.  The authors conclude that policies should focus on drivers of energy 
overconsumption (Swinburn et al., 2009). 
  Revenue from taxing SSBs is estimated to be sizable—a 20-percent increase in the price 
of SSBs paid by consumers (i.e., 0.44 to 0.47 cent per ounce) would generate $ 5.8 billion over a 
year.   The tax burden is found to be about 1 percent of food and beverage spending, but it is 
regressive.  This regressive nature of SSB tax is a concern and motivates other intervention 
proposals, such as financial incentives to increase supply of nutrient-rich, low-calorie beverages, 
or financial disincentives to curtail supply of nutrient-poor, calorie-dense beverages.   
To address childhood obesity, laws and regulations at State and local levels have been 
enacted to restrict the supply of sugar-sweetened beverages in schools.  In 2009, there are 31 
States which had policies limiting access to and/or setting nutrition standards for competitive 
foods, including sugar-sweetened beverages, at school (Trust for America’s Health, 2009).  
Children have responded positively to price interventions aiming at promoting healthy eating at 
school.  Because children consume more beverages and calories at home than at school, effective 
nutrition education, such as Team Nutrition (USDA-FNS, 2010), is needed to achieve a healthy 
overall diet. 
      16
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Table 1. Beverage categories and definitions. 
Beverage Category    Types of beverages included 
Sugar-sweetened (SSB)    Soda, fruit drinks, sports and energy drinks, and powdered mixes 
with added sugars 
Diet (low-calorie)     Low- or no-calorie versions of the above SSB category 
Skim milk    Milk labeled as skim or nonfat 
Low-fat milk    Milk labeled as low-fat or reduced, includes 0.5 – 2% 
Whole milk    Milk labeled as whole 
Juices    All fruit and vegetable juices containing 100% juice 
Coffee/tea    Liquid coffee and teas, excludes dry beans and leaves 
Bottled water    Bottled water, excludes tap water 
Note: Nielsen does not provide information to distinguish caloric and noncaloric coffee/teas. 
Source: Categories based on authors’ definitions.  
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Table 2. Variable definitions and summary statistics, 1998-2007. 
   Low-income    High-income 
Variable  Definition  Mean  St. Dev.    Mean  St. Dev. 
p1  Nominal price for SSB, $/gal  2.53  0.15  2.66  0.19 
p2  Nominal price for diet, $/gal  1.68  0.21  2.12  0.16 
p3  Nominal price for skim milk, $/gal  2.79  0.27  2.80  0.26 
p4  Nominal price for low-fat milk, $/gal  2.72  0.29  2.80  0.29 
p5  Nominal price for whole milk, $/gal  2.94  0.31  3.02  0.31 
p6  Nominal price for juice, $/gal  4.23  0.42  4.40  0.44 
p7  Nominal price for coffee/tea, $/gal  3.72  0.54  4.12  0.35 
p8  Nominal price for bottled water, $/gal  1.28  0.19  1.43  0.15 
w1  Beverage budget share for SSB  0.39  0.04  0.32  0.03 
w2  Beverage budget share for diet drinks  0.13  0.02  0.17  0.01 
w3  Beverage budget share for skim milk  0.04  0.01  0.06  0.01 
w4  Beverage budget share for low-fat milk  0.14  0.01  0.14  0.01 
w5  Beverage budget share for whole milk  0.09  0.01  0.05  0.00 
w6  Beverage budget share for juice  0.14  0.01  0.17  0.01 
w7  Beverage budget share for coffee/tea  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01 
w8  Beverage budget share for bottled water  0.05  0.02  0.06  0.03 
φ1  Average U.S. monthly temperature   54.37  14.93  54.37  14.93 
Notes: Temperature is measured in Fahrenheit (NOAA, 2009). Means for all budget shares are 
significantly different at least at the 5 percent level using t tests for independent samples.  
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Table 3.  Beverage consumption and calories by income and age. 











Average consumption  Ounces per day
 
  Sugary drinks  17.0  12.2    16.0  16.9 
  Diet drinks  3.6  6.7    0.9  1.3 
  Skim milk  0.6  1.2    0.5  1.4 
  Low-fat milk  2.5  2.5    4.1  5.7 
  Whole milk  2.0  0.9    4.2  2.0 
  Juices  2.8  2.6    4.5  3.6 
  Tea/Coffee  15.3  19.8    2.3  2.5 
  Bottled water  6.1  7.9    3.1  4.0 
Total 49.8  53.9    35.7  37.4 
         
Average calories  Calories per day 
  Sugary drinks  197  136    189  195 
  Diet drinks  2  3    1  1 
  Skim milk  6  13    6  14 
  Low-fat milk  37  37    64  85 
  Whole milk  37  16    79  38 
  Juices  38  35    63  50 
  Tea/Coffee  20  28    11  10 
  Bottled water  0  0    0  0 
Total 337  269    411  394 
          
Sample size  3292  5030    4080  3211 
Source: Authors’ calculation of 2003-06 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 
(NHANES), first-day intake data.   23
Table 4. Low-income population beverage demand elasticities in the U.S., 1998-2007. 
           E x p e n d i t u r e  
  Uncompensated Price Elasticities  Elasticities 
Beverage  εi1  εi2  εi3  εi4  εi5  εi6  εi7  εi8  εi 






*** -0.022 -0.034  1.023
*** 
  (0.082) (0.036) (0.023)  (0.041) (0.030) (0.045) (0.015) (0.023)  (0.0190 




*** -0.014 0.032 -0.013  1.024
*** 
  (0.104) (0.093) (0.036)  (0.063) (0.052) (0.069) (0.025) (0.039)  (0.021) 
Skim milk  -0.583
*** 0.085  -0.367 0.417 -0.023 -0.395    -0.031 -0.146  1.042
*** 
  (0.236) (0.128) (0.320)  (0.354) (0.308) (0.246) (0.081) (0.109)  (0.048) 
Low fat milk  -0.250
** 0.185
*** 0.115  -0.820
*** 0.097 -0.214
** -0.035  -0.032  0.955
*** 
  (0.115) (0.059) (0.095)  (0.188) (0.142) (0.101) (0.034) (0.047)  (0.037) 
Whole milk  0.242
* -0.459
*** -0.007 0.146 -0.631
*** -0.328
** 0.061  -0.014  0.990
*** 
  (0.129) (0.077) (0.128)  (0.221) (0.244) (0.136) (0.043) (0.062)  (0.021) 
Juices  0.473






  (0.127) (0.067) (0.067)  (0.103) (0.089) (0.130) (0.033) (0.049)  (0.016) 
Coffee/tea  -0.408 0.268  -0.057  -0.256 0.323 0.099  -0.802
*** 0.020 0.813
*** 
  (0.326) (0.188) (0.169)  (0.269) (0.215) (0.253) (0.148) (0.138)  (0.150) 









* indicate a level of significance of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Highlighted numbers indicate uncompensated own-price elasticities; all other uncompensated elasticities 
are cross-price estimates. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Nielsen Homescan data, 1998-2007.  24
 
Table 5. High-income population beverage demand elasticities in the U.S., 1998-2007. 
           E x p e n d i t u r e  
  Uncompensated Price Elasticities  Elasticities 
Beverage  εi1  εi2  εi3  εi4  εi5  εi6  εi7  εi8  εi 








  (0.096) (0.059) (0.021) (0.035)  (0.021) (0.049) (0.023) (0.039)  (0.045) 
Diet drinks  -0.591
***  -0.464
*** -0.024 -0.045  -0.058  0.024 -0.015 -0.101  1.274
*** 
  (0.112) (0.125) (0.033) (0.052)  (0.036) (0.076) (0.035) (0.063)  (0.052) 







  (0.107) (0.092) (0.170) (0.160)  (0.127) (0.086) (0.033) (0.057)  (0.050) 
Low fat milk  0.227






  (0.081) (0.064) (0.072) (0.107)  (0.073) (0.058) (0.024) (0.041)  (0.043) 
Whole milk  -0.054 -0.114 0.564
*** -0.383
** -0.804
*** -0.135 -0.020  0.129
* 0.817
*** 









  (0.093) (0.077) (0.031) (0.047)  (0.033) (0.084) (0.028) (0.048)  (0.048) 




  (0.278) (0.227) (0.079)
  (0.125)  (0.083) (0.181) (0.128) (0.159)  (0.143) 








  (0.192) (0.164) (0.054)





* indicate a level of significance of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Highlighted numbers indicate uncompensated own-price elasticities; all other uncompensated elasticities 
are cross-price estimates. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Nielsen Homescan data, 1998-2007. 
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Table 6.  Effects of a 20% tax on beverage calories and body weight status: age and income 










Change in calories (kcal/day):             
 All  beverages  -36.8  -33.3  -34.2 -33.1  -44.7  -40.0 
 Sugary  drinks  -37.5  -35.2  -35.9 -35.8  -50.3  -44.4 
 Diet  drinks  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1 0.0  0.0  0.0 
 Skim  milk  -0.3  0.3  0.1 -0.4  0.5  0.2 
 Low-fat  milk  -1.0  0.7  0.2 -2.2    2.5  0.6 
 Whole  milk  1.2  -0.1  0.3 2.6  -0.3  0.9 
 Juices  1.7  1.5  1.6 3.6  3.1  3.2 
 Tea/Coffee  -0.9  -0.4  -0.5 -0.6  -0.3  -0.4 
 Bottled  water  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 










Figure 1. Adult and child beverage consumption, 1977-2006. 
Source: Authors’ calculation of 1977-78 Nationwide Food Consumption Survey (NFCS), 1989-
91 and 1994-98 Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals (CSFII), 1999-2002 and 
2003-06 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). 